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1  | INTRODUC TION
Global inequalities regarding wealth, opportunities and power are 
amongst the greatest challenges addressed by theories of global and 
international justice. In this context, control over natural resources 
and fair distribution of benefits resulting from resource use are central 
topics. This article addresses these topics with respect to a particular 
type of natural resources, namely genetic resources. Fair and equita-
ble access and benefit sharing for genetic resources is one of the three 
key objectives of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),1  
and has been widely discussed not only in the theoretical literature but 
also at the policy level where it has been implemented as an access and 
benefit sharing scheme in the Nagoya Protocol (NP).2  As noted by 
other authors, at least two dimensions of justice have played a role in 
the interpretation of fair access and benefit sharing for genetic re-
sources in the literature. Echoing Aristotle these two types of justice 
were described as commutative justice (or justice in exchange) and 
distributive justice.3  ,4  I elsewhere discussed the access and benefit 
sharing scheme outlined in the CBD from the point of view of commu-
tative justice.5  The article at hand addresses the normative question of 
how benefits and burdens from genetic resources should be distrib-
uted fairly around the globe and thus focuses on distributive justice. 
By highlighting this justice dimension I do not want to deny that the 
different justice dimensions are connected. The aim of this paper is to 
contribute to a better understanding of the ethical challenges related 














Received:	12	November	2018  |  Revised:	2	April	2019  |  Accepted:	10	April	2019
DOI: 10.1111/dewb.12230  
O R I G I N A L  A R T I C L E









This article examines the question of who has a right to control and benefit from 
genetic resources globally. To this end it draws on different accounts in the resource 
rights literature with a focus on the specific features that distinguish genetic re-
sources from other types of natural resources. It will be argued that due to the in-
tangible and non-territorial nature of genetic resources, territorial rights over these 
resources	are	difficult	to	maintain.	Moreover,	the	vulnerability	of	genetic	resources	
implies that much cost and effort is required to protect them. I will argue that not 
only benefits resulting from the use of genetic resources but also these costs as-
sociated with their protection should be an object of distributive justice. To accom-
modate these two points I will introduce the model of a global biodiversity fund that 
could replace the bilateral access and benefit sharing negotiations suggested by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.
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this case distributive justice, separately. To this end, I will draw on the 
extensive literature of natural resource justice and examine how the 
arguments for different types of resource rights can be applied to ge-
netic resources. In doing so, a particular emphasis is set on the features 
that distinguish genetic resources from other types of natural re-
sources. The article starts with a brief summary of these features fol-
lowed by an introduction to the natural resource justice literature on 
which the article builds. I will then present the model of a global biodi-
versity fund for a fair and equitable distribution of benefits and bur-
dens from genetic resources and discuss it against the background of 
the current regulatory framework. Finally, the model of a global biodi-
versity fund will be compared to related suggestions on how to con-
sider distributive justice for genetic resources.
2  | GENETIC RESOURCES A S A 
PARTICUL AR T YPE OF NATUR AL 
RESOURCES
What	are	genetic	resources	and	how	are	they	being	used?	The	term	
‘genetic resources’ usually refers to valuable features or capacities of 
living organisms outlined in their genome, which can be used for vari-
ous purposes.6  Classical examples for the use of genetic resources are 
so-called bioprospecting projects, which have the aim to develop new 
drugs based on natural components. In such projects scientists start 
by collecting genetic resources in the form of samples of a large vari-
ety of plants. As a next step, they produce extracts from each of these 
samples and test them for their effect on cells that serve as a model 
for a medical condition. If certain extracts show the desired effect, 
they will be further analysed in order to isolate the effective 
compound(s), which could eventually lead to a novel drug.
Genetic resources are thus natural resources in the sense that 
they derive from nature and are instrumental towards satisfying 
human needs. At the political level too, genetic resources are treated 
as natural resources and placed under state sovereignty over natural 
resources, for instance, in the CBD and the NP. These international 
treaties establish a regulatory framework for fair access and ben-
efit sharing for genetic resources. Two central components of this 
framework	are	known	as	Prior	Informed	Consent	(PIC),	and	Mutually	
Agreed	Terms	(MAT).	PIC	stands	for	the	requirement	that	users	of	
genetic resources must inform the provider state about the intended 
use and can only utilize the genetic resource with the provider's ex-
plicit	consent.	MAT	implies	that	the	users	of	genetic	resources	nego-
tiate the terms of utilization (including benefits that will be shared) 
with the provider state.
As natural resources found in living organisms, genetic resources 
are a type of biological resources. However, genetic resources dis-
pose of special features, which necessitate different treatment and 
regulation compared to other types of biological resources such as 
timber or fish. This section briefly summarises four particular char-
acteristics of genetic resources namely that they are informational, 
non-territorial, vulnerable and non-obvious.7 
2.1 | Informational
When	we	examine	what	it	is	that	is	being	used	as	a	natural	resource	in	
the bioprospecting example above, we recognize that it is the informa-
tion about the composition and the biological production of the com-
pound that could be used to develop a medical treatment. If the 
bioprospecting project leads to the identification of an effective com-
pound, a company that aims at developing a drug from it, will try to use 
the biochemical and genetic information to find a way to get the effec-
tive compound in great amounts, for instance, by producing it through 
chemical synthesis, with genetically modified microorganisms or from 
plants that can be grown in large cultures in the user state. Thereby, the 
company will not depend on any further material supply of the original 
plant from the country of origin. The actual natural resource is thus the 
genetic and biochemical information provided by nature.8  ,9  ,10  ,11  This 
is a fundamental difference to other biological resources such as fish or 
timber where it is the material that is being used and which must con-
stantly be imported from the country of origin.
The genetic information could also be used in a breeding process. 
Let	us	 take	 the	example	of	 a	natural	 apple	 tree	variety	 carrying	a	
resistant gene against fire blight, a disease that affects apple and 
pear trees. This resistance could be crossed into commercial variet-
ies. Subsequently, no further supply of the natural variety is required 
to benefit from this genetic resource. Alternatively, the fire blight 
resistance gene could be transferred into commercial varieties using 
tools of genetic engineering again bypassing the need for further 
supply from the country of origin. These examples show that genetic 
resources are non-tangible, or in other words, informational. On the 
one hand, this is illustrated by the independence of material supply. 
On the other hand, the direct benefits resulting from these genetic 
resources, namely the resistance to a plant disease or the biochemi-
cal information about a compound, are themselves non-material.
2.2 | Non‐territorial
The non-territorial nature of genetic resources follows from the ob-
servation that they are informational. Because the value of genetic 
resources resides not in their material but in the genetic information, 
only a small material sample is required to derive benefits from these 
resources. This could be a leaf to extract genetic information in the 
6 The	CBD	defines	‘genetic	resources’	as:	“genetic material of actual or potential value” with 
‘genetic	material’	as:	“any material of plant, animal microbial or other origin containing 
functional units of heredity”. Although this definition is useful to illustrate that it is the 
genome that is being used, I believe that the reference to ‘material’ is misleading for 
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bioprospecting case above, or a seed to grow future generations of 
plants. No constant supply from the country of origin is needed. In 
that sense, the territorial connection is weaker for genetic resources 
compared to other types of natural resources which are continuously 
extracted	and	exported	from	the	country	of	origin.	Most	organisms	
carrying genetic resources occur on the territory of more than one 
state. However, usually only one state directly contributes the initial 
material sample of a genetic resource to the development of a product. 
This is again in contrast to territorial natural resources, where all states 
with occurrences of the resource in question will have the opportunity 
to supply their resources for the development of future products.
2.3 | Vulnerable
The likelihood for success of bioprospecting projects increases 
with the genetic variety that can be tested, or in other words, the 
higher the level of biodiversity that can be explored, the more 
promising is the project. The phrase ‘genetic resources’ is used as 
an appreciation of the instrumental value of biodiversity. In case 
of bioprospecting this value lies in the unknown potential of indi-
vidual	genes	or	species	that	are	part	of	this	biodiversity.	Moreover,	
biodiversity itself can be the source of new valuable genes, spe-
cies or ecosystems and the source of resilience that allows species 
or ecosystems to adapt to changes and novel challenges in their 
environment. If we look at genetic resources as biodiversity we 
become aware of the fact that this type of resources is particu-
larly vulnerable to decimation and extinction. The main threat for 
genetic resources does not consist in over-exploitation, as it is the 
case for other natural resources, but in their sensitivity to envi-
ronmental	change	and	degradation.	While	they	share	this	feature	
with material biological resources such as fish and timber, they are 
even more vulnerable because different species and ecosystems 
are sensible to different factors and effects. Protecting genetic re-
sources is a more ‘holistic’ enterprise than protecting singular fish 
or timber species. The vulnerability of these resources is particu-
larly relevant in an enquiry on distributive justice, because pro-
tecting biodiversity requires major investment of effort, time and 
finances. It will be argued that this burden should be fairly distrib-
uted just as much as the benefits resulting from genetic resources.
2.4 | Non‐obvious
For many traditional natural resources it is evident how they can 
be used to generate benefits. This is, for instance, true for fish or 
timber, which are used as nutrition or building material or for ores 
and gems which as raw material already have a high cultural value. 
In case of genetic resources the situation is quite different. In 
order to generate benefits from biodiversity, first, its useful com-
ponents must be identified and the development into a product is 
usually not straightforward. For instance, a bioprospecting project 
with the aim to develop a drug based on a natural compound de-
pends on human innovation in order to identify potential uses of 
natural plants. This is followed by further intellectual input into a 
research and development process to generate a product. The 
large degree of intellectual contribution required for such a prod-
uct and the tight nexus between natural contribution and intel-
lectual input are characteristic of genetic resources. This 
non-obviousness is also essential to understand the unethical di-
mension of so called biopiracy cases, in which companies used, for 
instance, traditional knowledge about the medical use of a plant 
without sharing any benefits with the community who contributed 
this essential information. In these cases the injustice is that the 
local community in question was neither acknowledged nor com-
pensated for their intellectual contribution. It is thus rather a case 
of commutative injustice than distributive injustice and will not be 
further discussed here.12 
3  | RESOURCE RIGHTS OVER NATUR AL 
RESOURCES
Before discussing resource rights for genetic resources I will roughly 
distinguish between two different accounts of rights to natural re-
sources	in	general.	While	these	theories	can	be	combined	to	some	de-
gree (as will be discussed at the end of this section) I emphasize their 
differences for their subsequent application to the case of genetic re-
sources	as	a	particular	type	of	natural	resources.	Following	Margaret	
Moore	and	Cara	Nine,13  ,14  ,15  I distinguish between, first, resource right 
scholars, who focus on territorial rights of political communities and 
argue that the use of natural resources should be governed by these 
rights and second, authors, who address rights to natural resources in 
the framework of cosmopolitan theories. They argue that the distribu-
tion of natural resources on earth is arbitrary and that everybody has 
rights to at least some marginal benefits from these resources. In the 
following, these two accounts will be briefly introduced.
3.1 | Territorial accounts – the focus on resource 
rights as jurisdictional rights
Theorists	such	as	John	Rawls,	David	Miller,	Margaret	Moore,	Cara	
Nine and many others discuss rights to natural resources as territo-
rial rights. They usually address the question of authority over natu-
ral resources and ask who legitimately has a right to govern them. 
The main focus is thus on the interpretation of resource rights as 
jurisdictional rights in the sense of self-governance rights although 
collective property rights also play a role.16  These scholars develop 
different arguments explaining why certain political communities 
have morally legitimate rights to govern natural resources on their 
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claims to natural resources in territorial accounts. He speaks of indi‐
rect claims, when rights to natural resources derive from other prior 
territorial rights to control borders or territory. In contrast, direct 
claims to resources derive from a direct relation that those who oc-
cupy a territory have to the resources localized on their ground.17  ,18  
Three types of arguments could legitimize resource rights as territo-
rial rights based on direct claims to resources. First, it has been sug-
gested that a political community improves or even creates the value 
of the resources in the territory that it occupies. In his criticism of 
territorial	resource	rights	Armstrong	speaks	of	“improvement‐based	
special claims”.19  ,20  The second type of reasoning refers to what 
Armstrong	calls:	“attachment‐based	special	claims”.21  ,22  ,23  It is ar-
gued that resource rights are justified by a special attachment 
through history, customs, culture or religion to the resources in 
question. The third argument for direct territorial claims to natural 
resources	has,	for	instance,	been	invoked	by	Margaret	Moore.	She	
argues that control over natural resources is instrumental for self-
determination of the community that occupies a territory because 
the life of this community is affected by rules around the extraction 
and	 use	 of	 resources	 localized	 on	 the	 respective	 territory.	Moore	
highlights that different communities vary in how they value differ-
ent handlings of natural resources.24  I discuss this argument as an-
other suggestion of territorial resource rights that is based (at least 
partially) on direct and not only on indirect claims to natural re-
sources because it also seems to be the particular relation that these 
communities have to the resources on their territory, which is rele-
vant for their role in self-determination. This relation is, however, not 
necessarily an attachment and thus different from the second 
argument.
3.2 | Cosmopolitan accounts – the focus of resource 
rights as property rights
In contradiction to the territorial positions, cosmopolitan thinkers 
argue that focusing on resource rights as a type of territorial rights 
disregards their global impact and context. On that account natural 
resources are distributive goods. The relevant question is not so 
much:	 “Who	 should	 govern	 these	 resources?”	 but	 rather	 “Who	
should	be	able	to	use	them,	possess	them	and	benefit	from	them?”	It	
is the property-right aspect of resource rights that is examined al-
though jurisdictional rights in the sense of global governance over 
natural resources can play a role too. According to cosmopolitans at 
least certain property rights should be shared worldwide. There are 
stronger and weaker versions of cosmopolitan accounts. Strong in-
terpretations hold that the full value of natural resources should be 
subject to distribution. Hillel Steiner, for instance, argues based on a 
luck egalitarian approach that disadvantages resulting from brute 
luck must be eliminated. He consequently argues for redistribution 
of the unequal shares of natural resources that people have received 
by luck.25 
On a weaker cosmopolitan account, the aim of global redistribu-
tion, does not amount to global distributive equality. Instead, such 
theories aim at ensuring that everybody on this planet can lead a min-
imally decent life. In that sense, for instance, Gillian Brock argues for 
a needs-based minimum floor principle, according to which distribu-
tive justice requires that people can meet their basic needs.26  Another 
author with a weak cosmopolitan approach is Thomas Pogge, who 
suggests that the population in affluent developed countries have re-
sponsibilities towards improving the miseries suffered by the global 
poor. One of the reasons for the existing inequality is that some enjoy 
significant advantages from natural resources whereas others are ex-
cluded from these benefits. The advantaged consequently have a 
moral duty to take measures towards letting the disadvantaged have 
a share in the profits realized from natural resources.27 
In spite of the different foundations of their cosmopolitan theo-
ries, several authors suggested a global tax or fund as an apt tool to-
wards distributive justice. According to Hillel Steiner's luck egalitarian 
model, everybody has an original right to a global average of natural 
resources. Those who use more than their share must pay the differ-
ence into a global fund, which serves as a ‘redress fund’ to compen-
sate those, who use less than their share. Interestingly, Steiner 
explicitly extends his understanding of natural resources to include 
genetic resources.28 	 The	 Global	 Resources	 Dividend	 (GRD),	 intro-
duced by Thomas Pogge, is a widely noted suggestion of a global tax 
on benefits from natural resources. Pogge speaks of a moderate pro-
posal because, unlike Steiner, he does not aim at an equal distribution 
of the full value of natural resources. He acknowledges a right of na-
tion states to control extraction and the use of natural resources 
within	their	territory.	Nevertheless,	he	states	that	“the	global	poor	
own an inalienable stake in all limited natural resources”29  and those 
who extract these resources and profit from them must pay what he 
calls a dividend rather than a tax to acknowledge this ownership. The 
dividend should be paid into a global fund, which will be disbursed to 
poor nations. Gillian Brock discusses a set of examples for global 
taxes such as the carbon tax or currency transaction tax (Tobin tax) 
















context of biodiversity, Steiner includes the human genome in his concept of genetic 
resources.
29 Pogge,	T.	op.	cit.	note	27,	p	202.
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of states.30  These examples show that the idea of a global tax is real-
istic and not simply a matter of theoretical deliberation.
With	the	separation	of	these	two	accounts	I've	attempted	to	il-
lustrate differences in starting questions and emphases. However, I 
am well aware that it would be misleading to present them as incom-
patible	alternatives.	For	instance,	Margaret	Moore's	territorial	the-
ory allows, or even requires, to take into account questions of unjust 
distribution that characterizes the current state of the globe.31  On 
the	other	side,	Thomas	Pogge	argues	that	his	requirement	for	a	GRD	
does not question the rights of national governments to control re-
sources within their territory.32  An understanding of resource rights 
as a bundle of rights, which includes different jurisdictional rights 
and different property rights33  ,34  ,35  can facilitate the combination 
of elements of the two approaches. Certain jurisdictional resource 
rights can be assigned to specific political communities while some 
property resource rights are attributed, in a cosmopolitan sense, to 
all people or political communities worldwide.
4  | TERRITORIAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR 
GENETIC RESOURCES
As it is the aim of this article to examine what type of resource rights 
could be justified for genetic resources, the two accounts presented 
in the previous section will now be applied to the specific case of 
genetic resources and analysed regarding the particular features of 
this type of resources.
To what extent can arguments for territorial rights be applied to 
genetic	resources?	The	description	of	genetic	resources	as	‘non‐ter-
ritorial’ might in itself suffice to reject the idea of territorial rights 
over genetic resources. As outlined before, the informational nature 
of these resources weakens their connection to the territory, from 
which an original material sample has been removed. This point can 
be elaborated by examining whether the three justifications for di‐
rect claims to natural resources introduced earlier can be applied to 
the case of genetic resources.
The first justification referred to improvement-based special 
claims. The non-obviousness of genetic resources, which comes with 
a requirement for high intellectual contribution to generate prod-
ucts, indeed indicates that improvement-based claims might play a 
role. However, it is not the provider countries, on the territory of 
which genetic resources were found, that could appeal to such im-
provement-based claims but exactly their counterparts namely the 
users of genetic resources. It is in user countries, where the potential 
of these resources is investigated and improved even before indus-
trial manufacturing of the final product sets in. This ‘improvement’ 
takes place in research and development processes and in proce-
dures to introduce the genetic information into new varieties or to 
turn it into useful compounds with the means of biochemical proce-
dures. Consequently, if at all, this argument can in itself be invoked 
to reason against direct claims on genetic resources by the state of 
origin.
The second argument for direct claims to natural resources re-
ferred to attachment-based claims, could they serve as a foundation 
for	territorial	rights	over	genetic	resources?	If	we	look	at	genetic	re-
sources as deriving from biodiversity of a certain territory or from 
singular species as instances of this diversity, it could indeed be ar-
gued that they are associated to a particular meaning for a region 
and that there is a particular attachment. But since this attachment 
is not based on material utilization, the attachment is not territory-
related. On this view, strong attachment to biodiversity flagship 
species	 such	 as	 the	 Giant	 Panda,	 the	 African	 Lion	 or	 the	 African	
Elephant go far beyond their territory of origin. These animals have 
cultural value also in European countries, for instance, where chil-
dren grow up with knowledge about these endangered species and 
with cultural adaptation of them as toys, in picture books, films etc. 
This generates strong attachment to these species around the globe. 
Moreover,	the	use	of	genetic	resources	outside	the	territory	of	origin	
generates particular attachment too, which can include emotional 
attachment and dependence, for instance, when genetic resources 
are	used	in	research.	Research	projects	can	rely	on	certain	species	
and researchers who study them for years may form a strong at-
tachment to them. To argue for direct territorial claims to genetic 
resources by referring to attachment is thus not convincing either.
Finally, the third argument for direct claims to natural resource 
was that they are instrumental for self-determination of the group 
that occupies a territory because the community occupying the terri-
tory is directly affected by rules around the extraction and use of the 
resource in question. In case of genetic resources ‘extraction’ of these 
resources is a one-time event and concerns only a little amount of ma-
terial, when, for instance, a leaf is removed from the rainforest. The 
main utilization of these resources takes place elsewhere. As informa-
tional resources, genetic resources are nonrivalrous. This means that 
the use of these resources by one party, for example, as agricultural 
crops, does not hinder others from using them elsewhere. Therefore, 
utilization of genetic resources in provider states is not affected by 
how they are being used in the user state. In sum, extraction of these 
resources will hardly affect the community in the provider state be-
cause of the small amount of material that is required and because 
utilization of these resources elsewhere will not compromise their 
use in the state of origin. It is thus unlikely that control over genetic 
resources plays a central role for self-determination of a community 
and therefore, the third argument does not provide any convincing 
justification of direct territorial claims to genetic resources either.
If my rationale so far has been correct, direct territorial claims to 
genetic resources cannot serve to justify territorial rights to genetic 
resources. This conclusion may be practically relevant, since the ac-
cess and benefit sharing scheme for genetic resources implemented 
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territorial rights for genetic resources as the CBD and NP repeatedly 
refer	 to	“sovereign	rights	over	natural	 resources”.	More	will	be	said	
about the concept of state sovereignty over genetic resources below.
5  | THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSIT Y FUND
After this critical analysis of territorial rights over genetic resources 
the cosmopolitan argument that there is no good reason why ben-
efits from natural resources should go exclusively to the political 
community that occupies the territory from which they were ex-
tracted, is even stronger for genetic resources compared to other 
types of natural resources. I will therefore turn to a weak cosmo-
politan model of resource rights for genetic resources and suggest 
an	account	that	draws	on	Thomas	Pogge's	GRD.	As	mentioned	ear-
lier, a cosmopolitan account of genetic resource justice is based on 
the notion that everybody should be able to benefit, at least to 
some degree, from these natural resources; this argument can also 
be extended to future generations. However, conservation of ge-
netic resources for the future comes with direct costs generated by 
conservation projects as well as opportunity costs resulting from 
the non-use, for instance, of land or timber in areas protected to 
conserve biodiversity. In his recent book on natural resource jus-
tice, Chris Armstrong highlighted that a theory of distributive jus-
tice should not only address the distribution of benefits but also of 
burdens. He tackled conservation of natural resources in the sense 
of protection, restoration and non-exploitation as examples of bur-
dens that accrue in the context of certain natural resources and 
must be considered.36  ,37  There are probably not many types of 
natural resources where this connection between benefits and bur-
dens is as direct, tight and weighty as in case of genetic resources, 
which I previously characterized as vulnerable to decimation and 
extinction. It is thus a direct matter of distributive justice that not 
only positive but also negative implications of biodiversity are being 
shared fairly and that members of current generations ensure that 
future generations can enjoy their share in benefits from genetic 
resources. This means that to safeguard this share, we have the 
common responsibility to maintain and protect biodiversity; rights 
to benefits from genetic resources are thus coupled with duties to 
protect them.38 
I attempt to establish the nexus between rights and duties asso-
ciated with genetic resources with the model of a global biodiversity 
fund, which is supplied by a levy on revenues from genetic resources. 
This fund should then be used to support biodiversity conservation 
projects in order to contribute to the fair distribution of the burdens 
arising from genetic resources. I will start with some remarks on how 
shares in benefits from genetic resources could go into the fund be-
fore I will say something about how revenues could be disbursed from 
the fund.
Contributions to the global biodiversity fund should not simply 
be paid as a gesture of solidarity or to discourage certain practices 
as many of the global taxes discussed by Gillian Brock. For in-
stance, the carbon tax or currency transaction tax (Tobin tax) have 
been developed primarily in order to discourage those activities on 
which the taxes have been imposed.39  Instead, contributions to 
the global biodiversity fund are morally required on grounds of dis-
tributive justice. The requirement to pay into this fund does not 
only apply to users that directly import genetic resources from 
provider states but it includes those who use genetic resources in 
their own country, be it from collections or from their own natural 
environment. These users also benefit from genetic information as 
a natural resource, and thus should contribute to the global biodi-
versity fund. The model is cosmopolitan in a weak sense because it 
does not require that the entire value of genetic resources should 
be equally divided amongst the global population, as suggested, 
for instance, by Hillel Steiner. I follow Pogge and other cosmopoli-
tan authors such as Brock or Chok Tan40  ,41  ,42  in the assumption 
that, even if direct territorial claims to natural resources are denied 
states fulfil important functions for their citizens and a global in-
ternational organisation is desirable and practically necessary.43  
States thus play certain roles in the model of the global biodiver-
sity fund. The regulation of access and benefit sharing for genetic 
resources has, so far, been discussed at the level of the United 
Nations and the CBD provides an existing framework for dealing 
with distributive justice for genetic resources. It makes sense to 
locate the global biodiversity fund at this existing intergovernmen-
tal institution with states as acting parties. Echoing Pogge's sug-
gestion, it could thus be states rather than single companies that 
pay into the global fund. In this case, states would pay the dividend 
on the financial profits made from genetic resources on their terri-
tory and they would levy taxes, which they can use to pay the con-
tribution to the global biodiversity fund. In order to warrant tax 
autonomy of sovereign states, it could be left to the state whether 
it charges the full amount of the revenues for the fund on the users 
or whether the state subsidizes part of this amount from other rev-
enues. The amount of the tax, like the contribution to the fund 
36 Armstrong,	C.	op.	cit.	note	18,	pp	220ff.
37 Fair distribution of environmental burdens is a topic prominently addressed in the field 
of	environmental	justice,	see:	Walker,	G.	(2012).	Environmental	Justice,	Concepts,	
Evidence	and	Politics.	London,	New	York:	Routledge.	 
This might be another interesting justice perspective on genetic resources, in which 
distributive justice aspects come together with justice as recognition, which Gordon 
Walker	defines	as	“justice	conceived	in	terms	of	who	is	given	respect	and	who	is	and	isn't	
valued” (Ibid: 10). Traditionally, the environmental justice literature seems to focus on 
environmental burdens such as pollution, flooding or noise rather than the requirement 
for biodiversity conservation.
38 In	addition,	the	connection	between	rights	to	benefits	and	duties	to	protect	could	also	
be understood as a matter of commutative justice, meaning that those who profit from 
genetic resources should pay back into the protection of nature as a compensation for 





Patriotism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
43 This	is	not	to	deny	that	in	certain	cases,	states	do	not	perform	their	functions	properly,	
for instance, when minority groups on state territory are being oppressed.
     |  7DEPLAZES‐ZEMP
itself, should depend on the profit made from the genetic resources 
in question. Possibly a modest and standardized contribution to 
the fund from all research institutions working with biological ma-
terial could also be required to acknowledge the importance of 
biodiversity for biological research.
This brings me to the second aspect of distributive justice that is 
tackled by the global biodiversity fund, namely the distribution of the 
burden of biodiversity conservation. Assuming that such a global bio-
diversity fund were established, the question arises, how its revenues 
would be disbursed. To implementing distributive justice I suggest 
three overarching principles: first, the fund should be used to ensure 
effective biodiversity protection to optimize its impact on distribu-
tive justice. It therefore should be used for particularly promising and 
sustainable biodiversity conservation projects. Second, the revenues 
should be disbursed such that those who have profited least from 
genetic resources and/or to whom highest conservation costs accrue 
will benefit most from the fund, because the aim of disbursement 
should be to contribute to levelling out existing inequality concern-
ing benefits and burdens. This means that usually projects involving 
low-income countries in biodiversity rich regions should be treated 
with priority because they carry the highest burden of conservation. 
However, certain projects should also be established in low-income 
regions with lower biodiversity, which also needs protection. Third, 
to ensure that distributive justice reaches not only states and institu-
tions but people, projects should consider the well-being of those af-
fected and involved by conservation projects in the implementation 
of the first two principles. Burdens that such projects might charge 
on local communities should be reduced and affected communities 
should benefit from these projects. As a general direction I would 
suggest, in deviation to Pogge's model, that the funds should rather 
go into individual biodiversity projects than to state governments. 
The reason for this is pragmatic because it seems to be a more ef-
ficient mechanism to ensure optimal distribution, conservation and 
beneficence. By a project-based disbursement scheme it seems, for 
instance, to be easier to strengthen international collaborations be-
tween citizens in biodiversity rich and infrastructure rich states and 
incentivise the development of concrete conservation projects that 
take into account needs of local communities.
It is clear that the global biodiversity fund will, by far, not suffice 
to cover all costs of biodiversity conservation, hence there is a need 
for additional contributions. To decide about the distribution of ad-
ditional costs, other principles such as the ‘ability to pay’ principle 
and the ‘contributor pays’ principle might be consulted.44  The first 
suggests that burdens should be distributed according to the ability 
to bear them. The latter, which in the context of climate change is 
often called polluter pays principle, suggests that those who have 
contributed most to the causes for biodiversity loss should bear the 
burden of conservation.
Some cosmopolitan scholars might criticize that the account of 
the global biodiversity fund dismisses the purpose of contributing 
to distributive justice because the fund is not directly used to 
combat poverty. I would respond by highlighting that poverty can-
not only be combated by disbursement of benefits but also by re-
ducing expenses, which is what the suggested fund is supposed to 
do by addressing the unfair distribution of environmental costs. 
Moreover,	 financial	 contributions	 to	 environmental	 programmes	
ideally produce employment and other opportunities for the local 
population. The aim of combatting poverty should thus not be seen 
as an alternative to biodiversity conservation. This is not the place 
to develop detailed strategies of how to combine the two agendas 
but poverty alleviation by supporting sustainable development, for 
instance, by providing incentives against ecologically harmful prac-
tices could be a sensible approach.45  It could still be criticized that 
people in areas with low biodiversity will not be able to profit from 
this global fund. As mentioned above, also regions with lower bio-
diversity should be considered, but since less conservation costs 
accrue to these regions, it seems to be justified that fewer projects 
will be allocated to them.
Others may object that this model only takes into account mon-
etary benefits from genetic resources and neglects, for instance, the 
non-monetary benefits listed in the Annex of the NP. It is true that 
this model does not consider non-monetary benefits such as re-
search collaborations, participation in product development, or 
training for research partners with less elaborated university sys-
tems. It is clearly important to share these types of benefits too. 
However, as these benefits are in no way specific to projects involv-
ing genetic resources they should be shared in all research collabora-
tions between research institutions in affluent and poor states. 
Other non-monetary benefits mentioned in the NP such as capacity 
building, education, food and livelihood security benefits, or social 
recognition are based on basic rights that should be granted to citi-
zens of all states and not be bound to negotiations on the use of ge-
netic resources. Non-monetary benefits resulting from the use of 
genetic resources should thus be addressed by other schemes that 
take into account the particular underlying claims and nature of 
these benefits and that extend to cases, in which the same type of 
benefits occur independently of any use of genetic resources.46 
5.1 | Integrating the global biodiversity fund 
into the CBD
Although the global biodiversity fund model presented in this 
article is rudimentary and can only suggest a general direction 
towards distributive justice for genetic resources, the aim is to 
present something that could be practically implemented in the 





involves, for instance, fair distribution of opportunities to determine research agendas 
and	priorities	De	Jonge,	B.,	&	Korthals,	M.	op.	cit.	note	3.).	These	are	clearly	essential	
issues that must be addressed, but for which the global biodiversity fund suggested here 
is not the right approach. In accordance with what was said before, I would argue that 
fair distribution of upstream benefits should be addressed with a broader scope and not 
be limited to the context of genetic resources.
8  |     DEPLAZES‐ZEMP
how benefits from genetic resources could be shared with the 
regulatory framework of access and benefit sharing outlined by 
the CBD and the component NP. The access and benefit sharing 
scheme established in the NP has been developed to address the 
unfair situation that companies in economically rich biodiversity 
poor states benefit from using genetic resources while low income 
states rich in biodiversity bear the burden of biodiversity conser-
vation. The current scheme requires that biodiversity rich states 
providing genetic resources must be informed and give consent 
to the use of ‘their’ genetic resources and that users of genetic 
resources should share some of their benefits with the provider 
states. However, as argued above, this model seems to be based 
on questionable territorial claims of provider states. The global 
biodiversity fund suggested here, pursues the same aim towards 
more distributive justice for benefits and burdens associated with 
genetic resources as the CBD without relying on these question-
able	 claims.	 Moreover,	 it	 shares	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 CBD	 to	 discuss	
benefits from genetic resources alongside with responsibilities 
to protect biodiversity. A global biodiversity fund as envisioned 
here even tightens this link compared to the access and benefit 
sharing framework outlined in the CBD and NP, which, in spite of 
mentioning both benefits and responsibilities, does not emphasize 
their connection. Article 9 of the NP merely suggests that par-
ties should encourage (rather than oblige) users and providers of 
genetic resources to use benefits towards conservation of biodi-
versity and sustainable development. The global biodiversity fund 
makes this connection mandatory by requiring that disbursements 
be used for biodiversity conservation projects.
Integrating the global biodiversity fund into an international con-
vention needs to be compatible with an understanding of states as 
sovereign parties. The question arises, whether the account of a 
global biodiversity fund with its criticism of territorial rights over ge-
netic resources allows for this. It is true that the CBD and NP repeat-
edly	 refer	 to	 “sovereign	rights	over	natural	 resources”.	However,	a	
close reading of the two treaties reveals that they refer to state sov-
ereignty over natural resources to explain the right of states to con-
trol access to genetic resources but not directly to explain that states 
have claims to a share in benefits.47  Exclusive territorial rights to a 
share in benefits from non-territorial natural resources need to be 
legitimated by direct claims to natural resources because there is no 
connection between the genetic resource and the territory of the 
provider state after the moment when a small material sample carry-
ing the genetic resource has been removed. However, territorial 
rights to control access to this material sample on the provider state's 
territory are legitimized by other territorial rights of controlling the 
borders of state territory and actions that take place therein, one 
could thus speak of indirect claims to genetic resources. The account 
presented here does not question states’ jurisdictional rights of 
governing access to state territory. State sovereignty over genetic 
resources would thus be interpreted in a weak sense as the right of 
governing access to territory and actions that take place therein in-
cluding the removal from material carrying genetic resources. To ac-
knowledge territorial rights of non-state nations, this account could 
include a requirement to consider local and indigenous communities, 
for instance, by obtaining their prior informed consent (PIC). 
However, in contrast to the requirements in the CBD and NP, PIC 
would only be required for access to the territory occupied by the 
respective communities or states and the actions taking place there 
and could probably be obtained using a standardised procedure. It 
would not extent to how these resources are being used after they 
have been exported.48  This model thus suggests that just access to 
genetic resources should be regulated independently of just sharing 
of benefits from utilizing them, for which the fund would be 
implemented.
Finally, the account of a global biodiversity fund is not only com-
patible with the CBD it would also highly profit from its institutional 
framework, which could host the global biodiversity fund and ensure 
fair disbursement of its content.
5.2 | Comparison to other models for global funds 
for genetic resource benefits
There have been previous suggestions of global funds for genetic 
resource benefits in different practical and theoretical contexts. 
In the following, I would like to briefly outline these alternative 
models and highlight the differences to the account presented 
here.
The most advanced suggestion has been successfully imple-
mented for agricultural plant genetic resources within the so-called 
Multilateral	 System	 (MLS)	 of	 the	 International	 Treaty	 on	 Plant	
Genetic	 Resources	 for	 Food	 and	Agriculture	 (ITPGRFA).	 The	MLS	
provides	an	access	and	benefit	 sharing	system	for	64	of	 the	most	
important	 crops.	 States	 ratifying	 the	 ITPGRFA	 commit	 to	 making	
‘their’	genetic	material	of	these	64	crops	easily	accessible	for	users	
through collections in the world's gene banks. To access these re-
sources users would only have to complete a simple Standard 
Material	 Transfer	Agreement	 using	 a	 template	 instead	of	 entering	
individual	PIC	and	MAT	procedures	for	each	project.	 In	return,	for	
receiving simplified access to these genetic resources, users must 
make developments resulting from their utilization freely accessible 
or a percentage of the benefits must be paid into a common fund. 
According	to	the	MLS	this	fund,	which	was	established	in	2008,	 is	
intended	“to	support	conservation	and	further	development	of	agri-
culture in the developing world”.49  Comparable to the account of a 
47 It	is	not	clear	from	the	texts	of	CBD	and	NP	how	the	requirement	to	share	benefits	
resources is ethically justified. The strong emphasis on fairness and equitability may 
indicate an underlying aim of contributing to distributive justice, however the tight link 
between providing access to resources and sharing benefits from them may be understood 
as an argument of commutative justice rather than distributive justice.
48 For	a	related	criticism	of	the	concept	of	‘state	sovereignty	over	genetic	resources’	see:	




2019 from http://www.fao.org/plant-treat y/areas-of-work/the-multi later al-syste m/
overv iew/en/
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global	biodiversity	fund	also	the	MLS	thus	directs	benefits	from	ge-
netic resources towards biodiversity conservation projects albeit 
with	a	focus	on	agricultural	plants.	The	MLS	goes	further	than	my	
account by regulating not only benefit sharing but also access to 
these resources by requiring that they be accessible in a collection. 
Unlike	the	account	presented	in	this	paper,	the	MLS	is	restricted	to	a	
limited	number	of	genetic	resources,	namely	the	64	most	important	
crops. The requirement of access and benefit sharing for these crops 
is justified with the central role that these plants play for global food 
security rather than with the importance of fair distribution of ben-
efits from natural resources. In spite of differences in scope, legiti-
mation and realization of this model, it is encouraging because it 
shows that the idea of a global fund can be implemented in the real 
world.
Interestingly the NP itself refers to a mechanism that could be 
used to implement a global fund. Article 10 refers to a global mul-
tilateral benefit sharing mechanism for the sharing of benefits in 
cases of genetic resources that occur in transboundary situations or 
when, for practical reasons, PIC cannot be obtained. It is explicitly 
noted that benefits shared through this mechanism should be used 
to support biodiversity conservation. Although the details of the 
implementation of such a mechanism remain vague and it has only 
been envisaged for exceptional situations, this article may be read 
as an indication for the compatibility of a global fund with the CBD.
This	 is	also	the	reading	suggested	by	Manuel	Ruiz	Muller,	who	–
drawing	on	the	groundwork	by	Joseph	Henry	Vogel–	suggested	a	de-
tailed account of a global benefit sharing fund for genetic resources.50  
,51 	In	accordance	with	my	account	Vogel	and	Ruiz	Muller	aim	at	ensur-
ing that benefits from genetic resources go into conservation of biodi-
versity and more importantly, they also start from the observation that 
genetic resources are non-tangible but informational. However, in con-
trast to this article, which starts from theoretical reflections on distrib-
utive	justice	and	resource	rights	for	genetic	resources,	Vogel	and	Ruiz	
Muller	 start	 from	a	pragmatic	economic	position.	They	argue	 that	a	
global fund would be a more suitable and efficient way of providing fi-
nancial incentives towards biodiversity conservation than the CBD's 
access	and	benefit‐sharing	system.	Ruiz	Muller	reasons	that	because	
genetic resources are informational, all states on the territory of which 
the respective genetic resource (usually species) occurs, must receive a 
share in benefits, therefore, most cases fulfil the conditions of a ‘trans-
boundary situation’ as outlined in NP article 10.52 	 Vogel	 and	 Ruiz	
Muller	suggest	that	those	who	profit	financially	from	genetic	resources	
should pay into a global fund and the states with occurrences of the 
resource in question would receive a share of these financial benefits. 
The authors argue that this would provide an incentive to protect bio-
diversity and ensure that efforts are made to maintain many species on 
state territory.53  The main difference to the account suggested in this 
paper	 is,	 that	 Vogel	 and	 Ruiz	 Muller	 adhere	 to	 territorial	 claims	 to	
genetic resources of the states of origin although they widen the con-
cept of state of origin from ‘state that provided the original material 
sample’ to ‘all states on which this instance of biodiversity occurs’ (my 
phrasing). They maintain that the fund should be disbursed to those 
countries with particular territorial rights to their genetic resources 
rather than as a matter of global distributive justice for benefits from 
genetic resources.
These examples show that the idea of a global biodiversity fund is 
not only supported by arguments of distributive justice but that there 
are also pragmatic arguments in its favour. An additional practical ad-
vantage pointed out by the discussed models is that a global biodiver-
sity fund scheme would circumvent the high administrative workload 
associated with the current access and benefit sharing scheme, which 
has been critically discussed as a potential hindrance of non-commer-
cial research involving genetic resources.54  ,55  ,56  The administrative 
burden could be reduced because in contrast to the CBD's scheme the 
global biodiversity fund model does not rely on obtaining PIC and ne-
gotiating	MAT	for	how	genetic	resources	are	being	used	outside	the	
territory of the provider state. This does not exempt those who wish to 
export biological material from the requirement of getting permission 
to access state territory and export material biological samples. 
However,	the	individualized	PIC	and	MAT	procedures	could	probably	
be replaced by standardised entry and export permits because usually 
only small biological samples are required that can be gained without 
any lasting impact on the place of origin.
6  | SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It was one of the aims of the CBD and the NP to ensure fairness 
and equity with respect to how benefits from the use of genetic 
resources are being shared globally and this against a background 
of requiring that all countries contribute to conserving genetic re-
sources as biodiversity.
The question of who should be able to profit from natural re-
sources in general, has been debated intensely. This article roughly 
distinguished between two accounts: A territorial approach, that 
conceives of resource rights primarily as jurisdictional rights held 
by nations, and a cosmopolitan approach that understands resource 
rights as a type of property rights that are not dependent on territo-
rial borders. To explore to what extent these theories can be applied 
to genetic resources, it is important to accommodate the features 
that distinguish this type of natural resources from others, namely 
that genetic resources are informational, non-territorial, their use is 
non-obvious and they are vulnerable to decimation and extinction. 
These features are essential for my arguments against direct territo-
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for the particular importance of relating the distribution of benefits 
from these resources to the distribution of costs for conserving them. 
I suggested that such a relation can be implemented in a global biodi-
versity fund, which is supplied by levies on benefits from genetic re-
sources	and	disbursed	for	biodiversity	conservation	projects.	While	
the current access and benefit sharing system in the CBD framework 
rather seems to be supported by a territorial account of justice over 
natural resources (in the sense of state sovereignty over natural re-
sources), the main arguments supporting the biodiversity fund model 
are	 based	 on	 a	weak	 cosmopolitan	 account.	More	 specifically,	 the	
model draws on Pogge's suggestion of a global resource dividend for 
traditional tangible resources. In Pogge's sense it could be states that 
pay into the biodiversity fund. This would facilitate the introduction 
of this fund into the framework of the CBD with states as ratifying 
parties.
Another difference between the global biodiversity fund and the 
existing access and benefit sharing framework is that also parties 
who use genetic resource within the state of origin have to share 
benefits from these resources. The reason for this is again that this 
model does not connect benefit sharing to providing access to state 
territory. Therefore, even in cases, where access and use of genetic 
resources take place in the same country, there is a requirement for 
benefit sharing.
As a third difference, this model treats the use of genetic re-
sources as natural resources differently from the use of traditional 
knowledge associated to these resources. The latter consists in an 
intellectual contribution and is thus not considered to be subject to 
resource rights but to the field of commutative justice as I discussed 
elsewhere.57 	 Local	 and	 indigenous	 communities	 will	 not	 loose	
weight in the new framework. As it will often be these communities 
on whom the success of biodiversity conservation depends, they 
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